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A STATE OF MEND: FACT OR FANCY?
W. DAVID CURTISS
It has been said that "the state of a man's mind is as much a fact as the
state of his digestion."' The statement is true if made with reference to a
civil action for deceit; but if made concerning a criminal prosecution for
obtaining property by false pretenses, it is false in the majority of juris-
dictions. Civilly, the state of a man's mind is a fact; criminally, it is not.
Is the distinction a sound one?
A purchases B's goods, promising to pay for them, but at the same time
not intending to do so. A civil action for deceit will lie.2 Deceit requires a
false representation of past or present fact. It is well settled, however, that
civilly a statement of present intention is a statement of existing fact.3 A
state of mind is a fact and an expression of intention is therefore a repre-
sentation of such fact. Of course the present state of mind must be misstated
in order for there to be a misrepresentation. Deceit cannot be based upon
the breach of a promise made in good faith with the expectation of perform-
ance. There must have been a fraudulent intention not to perform at the
time the promise to perform was made. While fraudulent intent is not
established by the mere breach of a promise, it may be inferred from circum-
stances, such as the lack of any reasonable expectation of ability to pay.4
A purchases B's goods with a preconceived intention not to pay for them.
By the prevailing rule, A is not subject to successful criminal prosecution
for having obtained property by false pretenses. 5 False pretenses requires
the misrepresentation of a past or present fact, and the weight of authority
is to the effect that criminally a statement of present intention is not a state-
ment of existing fact.6
1Bowen, L.J., in Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, L. R. 29 Ch. D. 459, 483 (1882).2For a discussion of the civil action of deceit, its historical development and its ele-
ments, see PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 85 (1941).3 See 51 A. L. R. 46, 63 (1927) ; 68 A. L. R. 635, 637 (1930) ; 91 A. L. R. 1295, 1297(1934); 125 A. L. R. 879, 881 (1940); PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS§ 89 (1941); Keeton, Fraud-Statements of Intention, 15 TEx. L. REv. 185 (1937);
Note, 38 .COL. L. REv. 1461 (1938).4 PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 89 (1941).5For a discussion of the crime of false pretenses, see CLARK AND MARSHALL, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES §§ 359-369 (4th ed. 1940); Orfield, Criminal Mis-
representation: Obtaining by False Pretenses, 14 NEB. L. BULL. 129 (1935).
GFor extensive citation of authorities, see 168 A. L. R. 833-849. 2 WHARTON,
CRIMINAL LAW § 1439 (12th ed. 1932): "A false pretense . .. must relate to a past
event or existing fact .... So a pretense that a party would do an act he did not mean
to do (as a pretense that he would pay for goods on delivery) was ruled by all thejudges not to be a false pretense under the Statute of Geo. II, and the same rule is
distinctly recognized in this country, it being held that a statement of an intention is
not a statement of an existing fact." See also 25 C. J. 595, 35 C. J. S. 649.
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Commonwealth v. Althavse7 is a typical case. Defendant loaned P five
hundred dollars, taking from P as collateral security for the repayment of
the loan a two thousand dollar negotiable receipt, and fraudulently repre-
senting to P that he (defendant) intended either to keep the receipt in his
possession or to place it as security with a bank. Defendant sold the receipt,
and was charged and convicted of its theft. Upon appeal, his conviction was
reversed, the court saying, in part:
"In effect he [trial judge] told the jury that if A buys property intend-
ing not to pay for it he obtains that property by a false pretense. In
that case A makes no representation at all. All that he does is to make
a promise, and a promise is not a representation of a fact. . . . The
fraud of obtaining property of another by buying it with an intent not
to pay for it might well be made a crime by the Legislature. But it is
not the crime of obtaining property by a false pretense."8
History may help somewhat to explain this limitation on the concept of
criminal fraud.9 The crime of obtaining property by false pretenses developed
at a time of unprecedented commercial activity in England. It was the era
of laissez-faire individualism,' ° the day of caveat emptor.1 Indeed successful
prosecutions for commercial frauds were not brought until after the middle
of the nineteenth century. 12 It was the temper of the times not to "cramp
the style of trade.' 3 Sometimes "a page of history -is worth a volume of
logic.' 4 And yet if history thus played a part in shaping the criminal law
of false pretenses, it would seem that the same historical forces would like-
wise have shaped the civil action of deceit. The point deserves consideration.
Professor Prosser discusses the history of deceit in these words:
"The action of deceit is of very ancient origin. There was an old writ
of deceit known as early as 1201, which lay only against a person who
had misused legal procedure for the purpose of swindling some one.
7207 Mass. 32, 93 N. E. 202 (1910).
8207 Mass. 32, 48, 50, 93 N. E. 202, 207, 208 (1910).
9 See HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SocIETY, ch. 1 (1935).10
"The various limitations to the concept of criminal fraud, like the limitations to the
concept of civil fraud, were largely the result of the effect of laissez-faire individualism
on the common law of the eighteenth century. We must remember, too, that the scope
of the doctrine of laissez-faire is far wider than the field of economics; indeed it is
laissez-faire, as a theory of. morals, which underlies Lord MIansfield's famous dictum
that a person who is fooled by his own credulity should be 'left to a civil remedy'."
Racivitch, False Statement of Intention as an Element of Fraud in Criminal Law,
21 TULANE L. REv. 639 (1947).
"1See Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L. J. 1133 (1931).1 2 HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SOcIETY 33 n. 94 (1935).
'
3Hamilton, The Ancient M11axim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L. J. 1133, 1184 (1931).
14Holmes, J., in New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U. S. 345, 349, 41 Sup. Ct. 506,
507 (1921).
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At a later period, this writ was superseded by an action on the case in
the nature of deceit, which became the general common law remedy for
fraudulent or even non-fraudulent misrepresentation which resulted in
actual damage. In particular, it was extended to afford a remedy for
many wrongs which we should now regard as breaches of contract, such
as false warranties in the sale of goods. Its use was limited almost
entirely to cases of direct transactions between the parties, and it came
to be regarded as inseparable from some contractual relation., It was not
until 1789, in Pasley v. Freeman, which is the parent of the modern
law of deceit, that the action was held to lie where the plaintiff had had
no dealings with the defendant, but had been induced by his misrepre-
sentation to deal with a third person. After that date deceit was recog-
nized as purely a tort action, and not necessarily founded upon a con-
tract. At about the same time, the remedy for a breach of warranty
was taken over into the action of assumpsit, and it was thus established
that it had a contract character. Thereafter the two lines of recovery
slowly diverged, although some vestiges of confusion between the two
still remain in many courts, particularly as to the measure of damages."' 5
Professor Hall cites the civil case of Pasley v. Freemnau. 1 6 as one that gave
great judicial impetus to the strong movement to extend the law of theft
which was unmistakable from 1780 on.17 In Pasley v. Freeinan, Pasley
sued Freeman for damages, alleging that Freeman encouraged him to sell
goods to Falch, falsely asserting that Falch was a good credit risk. Pasley,
relying upon Freeman's representation, sold the goods to Falch and sus-
tained loss. Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff Pasley.
In order fully to appreciate the significance of a passage from Professor
Hall's Theft, Law and Society shortly to be quoted, the case of R. v. Young'8
should be noted. It was decided within a week after the decision in Pasley
v. Freeman and by the same court. The defendants had falsely represented
to the complainant that a certain race was to be held upon which they said
they had placed bets, and they induced the complainant to do likewise. The
defendants were convicted of false pretenses.
The following statement by Professor Hall indicates the effect of the play
of the economic and social forces of the time upon the law of fraud:
"The intimate interplay between commercial and noncommercial frauds
has been pointed out.. Whether sound distinctions, legally significant,
can be made out between these two types is problematic; in both, the
conduct of the defendant is practically identical. Yet certain differences
may be recognized in the types of offenders which appear to have had
1 5
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 704-705 (1941).
103 Durn. & E. 51, 100 Eng. Rep. 450 (1789).
1 7
HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SOCIETY 19 (1935).
183 Durn. & E. 98, 100 Eng. Rep. 475 (1789).
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considerable effect. Thus in , . . R. v. Young, the offenders were pro-
fessional sharpers; whereas in commercial frauds, like . . . Pasley v.
Freeman, ostensibly respectable business men were involved. The domi-
nant social attitudes favored the encouragement of trade, and Patsley v.
Freenman, which provided a civil remedy, satisfied both the judges'
conscience and the needs of free commerce. These commercial require-
ments did not apply to R. v. Young, ,.. . The net effect was that appar-
ently respectable business men were immune from prosecution and sub-j ect only to civil suit . .. And the decisions show that the courts were
reluctant to attach a criminal liability to commercial transactions."19
It might also be pointed out that in so far as false pretenses was con-
cerned, the reluctance of the courts to attach a criminal liability to commer-
cial transactions cannot be traced to the historical fact that non-clergable
felonies were punishable by death, for obtaining propefty by false pretenses
was a misdemeanor. 0 .
A misstatement of present intention alone, since by the majority rule it is
not a misrepresentation of fact, will not serve as the basis of an indictment
for false pretenses. But if such misstatement of intention is accompanied
by a misrepresentation of fact which is relied on by the victim as an induce-
ment for parting with his property, an indictment can be found.21 In Regina
v. Jennison,22 defendant obtained property from A by falsely representing
himself to her as being single, and by promising to marry her although he
had no such intention. His conviction of false pretenses was sustained. It is
not necessary that a false pretense be the sole or even the primary induce-
ment toward parting with the property. If it is in fact relied upon by the
victim as an inducement, that is sufficient, however many other inducements
may have contributed to the result.
The traditional view that a state of mind is not an existing fact in a crimi-
nal action has not gone unchallenged. In some jurisdictions the attack has
been an indirect one. Massachusetts affords an interesting example.
Commonwealth v. Althause2 was decided in 1910. In 1925 Commonwealth
v. Morriso 2 4 arose. M owned a large quantity of obsolete spark plugs of
no market value. In agreement with M, and in order to assist him in creating
an artificial demand for these items, D and G fraudulently represented them-
selves as bona fide purchasers of such spark plugs and placed large orders
19 HALL, TH-FT, LAW AND SocIETY 33, 33 n. 94 (1935).201d. at 10, 18, 73.21See CLARY AND MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMlES §§ 359 (d),
365 (c) (4th ed. 1940) ; 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW § 1442 (12th ed. 1932).
229 Cox. C. C. 158 (1862).
23207 Mass. 32, 93 N. E. 202 (1910).2422 Mass. 116, 147 N. E. 588 (1925).
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with various dealers for them. These dealers bought the spark plugs from M
for cash and shipped them C.O.D. to the supposed purchasers, who dis-
appeared without' accepting delivery. M, D and G were indicted and con-
victed of false pretenses. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
upheld the convictions. Said the Court:
"A misrepresentation as to a person's present intention may be a false
pretense. . . .When a person enters into a contract to buy goods, he
impliedly represents that he intends to make a genuine contract; if such
is not his intention, he may be found to have made a false representa-
tion. In. such a case the intention not to pay for the goods is mnerely inci-
dental; the false pretednse is the assumption of a false character as a
contracting party. The facts in Commonwealth v. Althause . . .make
it inapplicable to the case under consideration. ' 25 (Italics added)
In other jurisdictions the attack on the prevailing rule has been more
direct.20 There are cases holding that a false statement of intention is -a
false pretense, even on the criminal side of the court.2 7 In State v.
McMahon, 28 defendant was found guilty of being a common cheat. He had
held himself out to the public as a purchaser of second hand automobiles.
In six instances he obtained automobiles by making a'small cash payment
to the seller and in addition thereto giving his note for the balance of the
agreed purchase price. At the time of giving these notes, defendant's inten-
tion was not to pay them when they fell due. The Supreme Court of Rhode
Island sustained his conviction:
"This state is committed to the doctrine that in an action for deceit
intention not to meet a future obligation is a question of fact to be sub-
mitted to the jury, and that misrepresentation of a present state of mind
as to such intention is a -false representation of an existing fact. The
rule is equally applicable in this criminal prosecution for cheating."2-
(Italics added)
25252 Mass. 116, 122, 147 N. E. 588, 590 (1925).25Some states have passed special statutes making criminal the obtaining of services
by fraudulent promise of compensation, or the obtaining of money by false promise to
work. See Note, 53 HARv. L. REv. 893 (1940).. On the related point of whether or
not the criminal enforcement of a labor contract constitutes involuntary servitude, see
Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U. S. 219, 31 Sup. Ct. 145 (1911); Note, 11 COL. L. REv. 363(1911). See also, Note, Labor Contract Laws and the Thirteenth Amendment, 24
HARv. L. Ray. 391 (1911).27See People v. Ames, 61 Cal. App. 2d 522, 143 P. 2d 92 (1943) ; State v. Huckins,
212 Iowa 283, 234 N. W. 554 (1931) ; State v. Bromley, 5 N. J. Misc. 195, 135 At. 813(Sup. Ct. 1927), aff'd, 104 N. J. L. 186, 138 Ati. 923 (1927) ; Commonwealth v.
McKnight, 289 Mass. 530, 195 N. E. 499 (1935), cert. denied, 296 U. S. 660, 56 Sup.
Ct. 245 (1935). See also Smith v. Fontana, 48 F. Supp. 55 (S. D. N. Y. 1942) ; Rex.
v. Alexandra, 26 Crim. App. R. 116 (1937).2849 R. I. 107, 140 Atl. 359 (1928).
2949 R. I. 107, 108, 140 Atl. 359, 360 (1928).
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The issues here involved were brought into sharp focus in the 1946 case
of Chaplin v. United States,3° decided in the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia. Defendant borrowed money from M, repre-
senting that he would purchase certain liquor stamps with the money and
that he would later repay it. At the time of acquiring the money, defendant
intended neither to use it for the stamps nor to repay it. His conviction of
obtaining property by false pretenses was set aside by a divided court.
The majority decision notes the traditional view that a statement of
present intention is not a statement of existing fact in a criminal action,
defends the view as reflecting sound "business policy", and holds in accord-
ance with it.
"However, where, as here, the act complained of-namely, failure to
repay the money or use it as specified at the time of borrowing-is as
consonant with ordinary commercial default as with criminal conduct,
the danger of applying this technique to prove the crime is quite appar-
ent. Business affairs would be materially incumbered by the ever present
threat that a debtor might be subjected to criminal penalties if the
prosecutor and the jury were of the view that at the time of borrowing
he was mentally a cheat. The risk of prosecuting one who is guilty of
nothing more than a failure or inability to pay his debts is a very real
consideration." 3'
judge Edgerton's dissent is scholarly and convincing. He reasons: (1)
that "difficulties of proof are seldom greater in criminal cases than in civil,
except that the prosecution must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt,"3 2
(2) that "the rule which the court adopts will make prosecutions impossible
even when admissions or other evidence make guilt obvious," 3 (3) that
."prosecutions are not undertaken without evidence and convictions do not
withstand attack unless they are supported by sufficient evidence," 34 (4) that
"the danger of a counter suit for malicious prosecution is always present
30157 F. 2d 697 (App. D. C. 1946). See 168 A. L. R. 833; Note, 21 TULANE L.
REv. 639 (1947).
31157 F. 2d 697, 698 (App. D. C. 1946).321d. at 700. See Note, 34 HAAv. L. REv. 557 (1921): "The criminal courts have
hesitated, however, to hold that a promise not intended to be kept is a misrepresenta-
tion of fact .... The reason is, probably, the fear of a tendency to regard every promise
subsequently broken as having been made with an intention not to keep it. But this
would seem to be sufficiently guarded against by the requirement, in criminal cases, of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The civil cases show that a false statement of this
sort is as dangerous to the general security of transactions as any other false repre-
sentation. Only a very narrow interpretation of the criminal statutes has let it go
unpunished."
33157 F. 2d 697, 700 (App. D. C. 1946).34Ibid.
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to discourage unfounded charges,"5 (5) that "the court suggests that the
law should not jeopardize legitimate business. But this is the unavoidable
price of protection against illegitimate business," 36 and (6) that "since civil
redress is not punitive but compensatory, the decision means that the law
of the District of Columbia offers no deterrent to this sort of fraud."37
One of the points would seem to deserve further consideration.
It is undeniably true that the possibility of a counter suit for malicious
prosecution will tend to discourage unfounded charges. 38 Certain limitations
on the possibility of succeeding in such an action should, however, be recog-
nized. One such limitation is well illustrated in Kittler v. Kelsch.3 9 Defend-
ant, a prosecuting attorney, received an anonymous letter charging the
plaintiff, a reputable woman, with maintaining a disorderly hous6. Later
he received another letter, purporting to be signed by her, admitting the
truth of these charges. Upon this information, defendant instituted criminal
proceedings against the plaintiff, making the complaint himself. The pro-
ceedings were dismissed when it was discovered that the plaintiff's name
had been forged to the letter of admission. The plaintiff brought an action
for malicious prosecution, and the defendant demurred. The demurrer was
sustained. Where a prosecuting attorney passes upon the sufficiency of evi-
dence within his own knowledge as a basis for a criminal prosecution, he
is acting in a quasi-judicial capacity and is not liable for malicious prosecu-
tion.40 The case thus suggests a situation in which an action for malicious
prosecution may not be available to a plaintiff injured by false criminal
charges. 41 Two judges dissented in Kittler v. Kelsch, taking the position
that when a prosecuting attorney himself initiates a complaint, he.goes be-
yond his quasi-judicial function, and may be held personally liable for his
acts. There is additional authority to this effect. 42
35Ibid.
361bid.37Ibid.38For a discussion of malicious prosecution, see PROSSER, HANBOOK OF THE LAW OF
ToRTs § 96 (1941).
3956 N. D. 227, 216 N. W. 898 (1927) ; Note, 12 ,MINN. L. REv. 665 (1928).4 0A fortiori, a prosecuting attorney enjoys an absolute privilege when he merely
conducts a criminal proceeding based on a complaint sworn out by another; in such
case he is not liable for malicious prosecution even when he acts in bad faith and with-
out probable cause. See PROssER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 96 (1941).41
"If the view of the majority be correct, then any state's attorney may sit down any
time, draft a complaint and . . . charge any crime he wishes, and though it is found
to be just as false as was the charge in this case . . . , yet he would be immune from
suit because after he had made the complaint he submitted it to himself as state's
attorney and passed judicially upon whether or not it was in form a sufficient basis
for prosecution." Burr, J., dissenting in Kittler v. Kelsch, 56 N. D. 227, 261, 216
N. W. 898, 912 (1927).42See Leong Yau v. Carden, 23 Hawaii 362 '(1916); Schneider v. Shepherd, 192
Mich. 82, 158 N. W. 182 (1916).
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There are other limitations on the possibility of succeeding in an action
for malicious prosecution. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show
that the defendant initiated or continued the criminal proceeding without
"probable cause", and "maliciously". 43 An elaboration on these points is
beyond the scope of this paper. It is enough here to suggest caution against
overstating the possibility of a counter suit for malicious prosecution as an
effective means of discouraging unfounded criminal charges. Professor
Prosser has written:
"Malicious prosecution is an action which runs counter to obvious poli-
cies of the law in favor of encouraging proceedings against those who
are apparently guilty, and letting finished litigation remain undisturbed
and unchallenged. It never has been regarded with any favor by the
courts, and it is hedged with restrictions which make it very difficult
to maintain."' 44
And another writer has pointed out that "it is notable how rarely an action
is brought at all, much less a successful one, for this tort."4 5
A state of mind-fact 'or fancy? Civilly, it is fact; criminally, by the
prevailing rule, it is not. But there seem to be good reasons why it should
be. By whom, however, should the matter be decided, by the legislatures,
or by the courts? Hear Judge Lehman's words on judicial interpretation
of a criminal statute, although not on the exact point of state of mind:
"It is the function of the legislature to determine whether modern con-
ditions dictate a wider definition of acts which should subject the wrong-
doer to criminal responsibility. We may not assume that function even
where the established definition of a crime may be based upon distinc-
tions which to us at the present time seem inconsequential. We may
not hold that acts come within such definition which under recognized
authority have been hitherto excluded." 46
43See PROSSER, HANDBOO OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 96 (1941).441d. at 870.4 5WINFIELD, LAW OF TORT 664 (1943).
46People v. Noblett, 244 N. Y. 355, 155 N. E. 670 (1927). Common law larceny by
trick and device required that the victim be induced to part with possession of his
property only, whereas obtaining property by false pretenses required that both posses-
sion and title pass to the defendant. In this case X paid defendant $550. advance rental
for an apartment under a sub-lease. Defendant agreed that X should have possession
one week later. Defendant's own lease had at that time expired, and X never received
possession of the apartment. Defendant was charged and convicted of common law
larceny by trick and device, the jury finding that X had parted with possession of his
money only, and had reserved title until his receipt of possession of the apartment.
Upon appeal the conviction was reversed on the ground that the evidence of the ad-
vance payment indicated that X had transferred both possession and title to the money.
The case is noted in 27 COL. L. REV. 737 (1927). There are only statutory offenses,
no common law crimes, in New York. See N. Y. PENAL LAW § 22. See also the
definition of larceny, N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1290.
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But hear Judge Edgerton, writing on the precise point of state of mind:
"We should decide the question before us 'in accordance with present
day standards of wisdom and justice rather than in accordance with
some outworn and antiquated rule of the past' which was never adopted
here." 47
47Chaplin v. United States, 157 F. 2d 697, 699 (App. D. C. 1946) (dissenting opinion).
Defendant was indicted for false pretenses under D. C. CODE (1940) § 22-1301. But
see D. C. CODE (1940) § 22 - 107 which deals with punishment for offenses not covered
by provisions of the Code, and thus contemplates common law crimes. See Palmer v.
Lenovitz, 35 App. D. C. 303 (1910), and United States v. Davis, 71 F. Supp. 749
(D. D. C. 1947).
